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THE BRITISH SYSTEM

It can be said without fear of contradiction, that there is a need,
both perceived and real, for reform of the British civil justice system.
Although different, I draw no distinction between Scotland's and England's
justice systems. However, to the extent that any distinction could be
drawn, perhaps it would suggest that the case for reform is stronger in
Scotland. The tension between the disenfranchisement of the middle
classes from the British judicial system and the impossible demands placed
upon a publicly funded Legal Aid system have, in part, been recognized
through legislation in Scotland. Specifically, the laws of Scotland allow
enhanced fees in cases where solicitors take instructions on a speculative
basis, "no win - no fee," and there are proposals pending in England for
similar reforms. To the extent that one measure of a civilized society is its
system of law, we must be concerned when a system fails to provide
access to justice for all and where all do not stand equal before the law.
There is also the problem of failing public confidence in a system
which can, on the one hand, deliver what are perceived to be large
verdicts in defamation and libel cases, and modest, inadequate
compensation for those who have suffered devastating personal injury, or
have seen their loved ones killed through the negligence of others, such as
the recent thalidomide victims. I pause to reflect that parents who have
suffered the tragic and immeasurable loss of their child might find such a
death in Scotland valued at about £3000. It has been said that reform of
the law is far too serious a matter to be left to the legal profession.
Instead, I submit that the responsibility for correcting such matters must lie
with us all. The law must reflect the society it serves. It must change and
develop if it is to continue to be relevant rather than becoming a museum
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relic preserving ideas of the past which have increasingly little relevance
for today's needs. Therefore, we need to look at other legal systems. We
need to experiment and find ways of delivering access to justice, and in a
way which does not impose intolerable burdens on public expenditure.
In the areas of personal injury and wrongful death, there is a
useful comparison to be made between the civil justice system in Britain
and that in the United States which, to some extent, shares a common
origin with the British system, although it has developed quite differently.
If access to justice is as I suggest, a fundamental indicator of the relevance
of any system of justice, then the system in Britain is in need of radical
reform. Presently, only those who have been granted Legal Aid or who
are very wealthy can afford the costs and the risks inherent in most
litigation. Eligibility for Legal Aid has increasingly been restricted, and
even those who are granted Legal Aid, subject to a contribution, often find
the contribution so large in relation to their means as to make the sacrifice
too great. Those who accept the offer of Legal Aid will find their freedom
to instruct a solicitor restricted to those lawyers prepared to act for the fee
rates paid by the Legal Board, which fall considerably short of those paid
by privately instructing clients.
The law of supply and demand dictates that many of the best
lawyers, whether solicitors or counsel, often prefer to act for the corporate
or private client who pays "top dollar," while those who depend upon
Legal Aid may be restricted to the less experienced or perhaps less able
attorney. While this is a general comment subject to many exceptions, it is
nonetheless true to say that the Legal Aid client is placed in a different
position from those able to instruct privately. Lawyers who act for Legal
Aid clients agree to provide their services at a hugely discounted rate.
Many skilled and able solicitors and counsel agree to this, but many do
not. It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of a system of publicly funded
litigation that there will always be a need for cost control, and inevitably
fees paid from the public purse will fall short of those available from the
private client. I would argue not only must we achieve access to the courts
for all, but the quality of representation should be determined by needs of
the case rather than the wealth or poverty of the claimant. It is surely right
that all should stand equal before the law and in that sense "David" is
surely entitled to be equal with "Goliath."
It cannot be just that a Legal Aid litigant is advised by an
inexperienced or less able lawyer working within budgetary constraints,
often overloaded with cases, in an effort to compensate for an inadequate
fee structure. Meanwhile, those he sues are represented by the most able
in their field, fully prepared and able to apply the skill, time, and
resources necessary to properly argue their client's cause.
This
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observation is not a criticism of solicitors and counsel who represent
clients of Legal Aid, but a reflection of the uneven playing field often
facing the Legal Aid litigant.
It is also clear that the present Legal Aid System is, by design,
bound to fail. It is the classic dilemma of infinite demand and finite
resources. Is it conceivable that we could have a system of publicly
funded litigation which meets any and all demands placed upon it? Such a
system would inevitably consume a disproportionate amount of public
expenditure. Legitimate claimants should be able to bring their claims
before the courts, and those responsible for acts of negligence or who
cause injury and death, should not be able to hide behind the imperfections
of a legal system which denies justice to victims.
Great Britain's Legal Aid System is also one which, by design,
encourages inefficiency. Fee charging is either by the hour or by the act
performed. It is said that this scheme leaves the system open to abuse.
For example, unscrupulous lawyers may make up for poor rates by doing
unnecessary work or allowing pointless litigation to proceed through the
courts with the sole purpose of charging more fees.
In response to some of these problems, the legal profession has
seen the introduction of new rules in Scotland which allow solicitors and
clients to enter into special fee arrangements which in turn enable lawyers
to recover enhanced fees of up to 100% if they are prepared to take on
litigation speculatively; that is no win - no fee. Similar proposals are
being considered in England. The new rules are subject to a number of
qualifications and do not cover all the fees that a solicitor would normally
charge a client. Lawyers are restricted to fees that might be recoverable
from the losing party in the event of success. These fees are often much
less than the actual fees and costs incurred, and there are a number of
other restrictions and qualifications. These proposals remain wedded to
the principle of paying lawyers on an hourly rate. It is not equivalent to
the American contingency fee system with lawyers paid on a percentage of
what is recovered in damages. Nonetheless, these proposals recognize a
remarkable departure from one of the often voiced objections to the
American system; namely, that a lawyer should not have an interest in the
outcome of his client's case. It now appears that such an interest is not
only permissible, but that it may in fact be a good thing to the extent that
lawyers under these arrangements are unlikely to pursue pointless
litigation.
It is unclear to what extent these proposals will address the
problem of access to justice, or ensure that the choice of lawyer is
governed by the needs of the case rather than the means of the client. Nor
is it clear whether this new approach can or will generate sufficient
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additional fees to compensate solicitors for the risk of taking a case on a
speculative basis. Such speculative arrangements impose a considerable
risk, particularly for solicitors in smaller practices. Resources and
manpower in pursuing litigation can be considerable and the failure to
recover a fee can cause considerable financial problems for the solicitor.
In the American system, where lawyers are paid a percentage of damages
recovered, usually between twenty-five to forty percent, depending on the
type of case and the risk involved, the sums recovered are often sufficient
to provide a "cushion" for cases which do not succeed. It is not clear
whether the current proposals would achieve figures sufficient to
compensate for the risk involved. There is also the difficulty that litigants
in Britain, even in a speculatively funded action, continue to face perhaps
the biggest disincentive to pursue their rights; namely, the "expenses rule"
where the loser pays expenses. The very persons which the new proposals
seek to help, those who cannot afford to instruct lawyers privately and who
by definition are not wealthy, are asked to take the risk of paying expenses
if they lose. Expenses can be huge and sufficient enough to overwhelm
the resources of most middle income earners.
In England there is a proposal for litigants to buy insurance to
cover expenses. It is not clear to what extent this system will work. No
equivalent system is in place in Scotland and those wishing to pursue an
action are at a considerable disadvantage.
Corporate and wealthy
individuals defending actions are at an advantage which often deters others
pursuing litigation or, if raised, can see litigation prematurely settled at
below value settlements. Every lawyer in practice in Britain is aware that
the expenses rule is often used to bludgeon litigants into settlements which
do not properly reflect compensation for the loss they have suffered, but
reflect a compromise to avoid the expenses inherent in the judicial process.
In comparison with other systems, most notably the system in the
United States, it is often said that the British system avoids the excesses of
massive jury awards. One notable exception in Britain and often the
subject of adverse comment, is the difference between the perceived huge
awards sometimes made by juries in defamation and libel cases (principally
in England) for plaintiffs who suffered hurt feelings and the more modest
awards for plaintiffs who suffered devastating personal injury. This
exposes a number of problems and contradictions in the British system.
The adjectives used to describe some United States' jury awards
presupposes they exceed what is just and, by definition, what would have
been awarded in a similar case in Britain.
The difference in result in many cases is, in my view, arrived at
for one very important reason. For the most part, damage awards in
Britain are decided by judges whilst in the United States by juries. If the
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purpose of an award of damages is to compensate victims for their loss,
past, present and future, and to compensate them for their pain and
suffering, who is best able to assess damages? It is true that juries are
composed of ordinary people who are not experts and who may, from time
to time, make mistakes. Many who criticize the system in Britain say
judges are conservative in their approach, and they take into account wider
concerns which are sometimes irrelevant, such as the effect large awards
may have on insurance premiums, all of which have little to do with
compensating the individual concerned. What is clear is that the level of
damages recoverable in Britain for personal injury and wrongful death
cases fall considerably short of the damages generally recoverable in the
United States. Many dealing with personal injury litigation believe that the
proper course is to allow juries to determine personal injury matters, to
have a greater faith in the jury system, and to allow the courts to correct
those awards if it can be demonstrated that juries have behaved
unreasonably. As will be seen, the effect of jury awards is wider than just
the proper compensation of those affected by the negligence of others.
Although jury trials are sometimes available in Britain, they are not
commonplace, nor are they easy to obtain. Perhaps there is reason to
extend the role of juries to personal injury cases on the basis that they are
as qualified as judges to assess the proper compensation deserved in a
case. The appreciation of pain and suffering, and the likely impact on an
individual's life and his or her ability to earn a living, are not matters
which judges are any more qualified to assess than is a member of the
public applying his or her life experience. Some might argue that the
experience of ordinary people in such an assessment is a great deal more
relevant than that of judges. The perceived failure of our system to
properly compensate those who have been the victim of personal injury has
led lawyers, in cases where the opportunities exist, to take litigation to
other countries in order to recover higher compensation.
II. THE UNITED STATES' SYSTEM
In contrast to the British system, the system in the United States
has much more of a free market feel to it. There is no equivalent system
of publicly funded litigation and there is no equivalent rule about expenses.
Those who wish to litigate may sue whomever they want, without fear of
expenses. However, first they must find a lawyer. Those who wish to
pursue litigation have a choice between retaining attorneys on an hourly
rate or engaging attorneys on a contingency basis. When an attorney is
engaged on a contingency fee basis, the lawyer is largely responsible for
the funding and associated costs of any litigation, before taking on a case
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they must be convinced of the prospects of success. All costs and fees are
contingent upon success. The effect is that American attorneys will screen
cases to determine the prospects of success. Those wishing to pursue
hopeless and pointless litigation will not readily be able to engage
attorneys, and those who initiate claims will find that their attorneys
constantly monitor the prospects of success.
Another effect of the
contingency fee system is that it allows those with claims to choose the
attorney best suited to the case rather than seek out an attorney prepared to
work at discounted fee rates with the obvious risk that the best lawyer for
the job is not retained.
It would now appear acceptable and perhaps even appropriate for
lawyers in Britain to have an interest in the outcome of litigation. This
much is implicit in the most recent proposals for Scotland and England,
but what can be said of the comparison between our system and that in the
United States? There is, I would suggest, greater access to justice in the
United States. Almost everyone with a claim is in a position to retain
attorneys on a contingency fee basis. The system involves no public
expenditure and therefore imposes no burden on the public purse. The
system does deliver larger awards for personal injury and wrongful death
cases. It is really a question of which system delivers best in the widest
sense. Those against contingency fee systems argue that it has led to an
explosion in litigation, log jammed the American court system, and
negatively affected business. Another argument against the contingency
fee system blames large jury awards for increased insurance premiums,
driving the United States medical system to the point where many doctors
cannot afford the insurance premiums. When examined, most of these
observations are found to be largely anecdotal and have little basis in fact.
Litigation is certainly popular in the United States. However,
there is little evidence that its popularity has been fueled by speculative
litigation. Much of the litigation is raised by the government seeking to
recover student loans and other debts, and viewed in another way the
courts are being used for precisely the purpose they are designed. That
purpose is to regulate disputes and to settle claims. Equally, there is little
evidence to suggest that litigation harms the competitiveness of American
firms or that there is any link between insurance costs and the performance
of business. So far as the medical profession is concerned, it is important
not to exaggerate what is happening in the United States. Most doctors do
very well despite insurance premiums. The reality is that very few
medical malpractice cases succeed. Fifty percent of those filed result in no
awards at all and whilst insurance premiums for doctors doubled in the
years 1976 to 1984, this did not equal the rise in average earnings for that
period. In fact, as a percentage of earnings, premiums fell. There appears
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to be little evidence to suggest that larger jury awards in the United States
have imposed an unacceptable social cost by penalizing business or the
medical profession in such a way that they are adversely affected. Indeed,
per contra, it can be argued that in a country which does not have a
national health service, or the extensive welfare system provided in
Britain, such awards are necessary to properly reflect the costs of ongoing
medical care, support, and loss of income for those injured through the
fault of others. In Britain, where awards have been much smaller, the
State, through the National Health Service and the system of State
Benefits, has to some extent paid the bill for the ongoing effects of those
suffering long term disability who have not been adequately compensated
for the effects of their injuries. It can be argued that as pressure on public
funds mount, affecting not only funding for the Legal Aid, but also the
National Health Service and other State Benefits, the better way to
compensate those affected by the negligence of others is to have the
negligent party pay the full cost, relieving the state of responsibility for
funding litigation or looking after the victim.
There is, of course, another consequence of American jury
awards; what I call the "economic imperative."
This describes the
consequence of such awards on those who have to pay them, notably the
insurance industry or large corporations. The manufacturers of defective
products are, as a matter of economic necessity, more likely to react to
large damage awards than to small awards. The prospect of facing
multiple claims is such that corporations are likely to react to improve
safety standards and correct defective products to avoid multiple large
damage awards. If the death of a child were to result in an award of
£3000 it will have little financial impact on a company or insurer. If the
award were $3,000,000 the equation is of necessity different. The United
States has seen many improvements in safety standards which are a result
of large jury awards or the threat of them. Large verdicts are more
effective than the periodic promotion of higher safety standards by
government departments or other bureaucratic agencies. The "economic
imperative" is a stimulus to improve standards. Perhaps it comes as no
surprise that corporations react more quickly when faced with multimillion
dollar law suits rather than the prospect of a modest fine imposed by a
criminal court after a breach of a health and safety regulation.
In summary, the American system appears to offer many
advantages. Contingency fees allow all, irrespective of their personal
circumstances, to retain attorneys most appropriate to the case. Those
attorneys are unlikely to accept litigation where there is no prospect of
success since not only do they put their fees at risk, but in most cases they
risk the cost of funding actions. Jury awards are large enough to make the
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contingency fee system work to the extent that prospects of a share in
damages are sufficient to compensate the lawyers for the risks taken. The
effect of larger awards is measured partly as the "economic imperative" to
improve standards and by imposing the true costs of the negligence on a
guilty party rather than the state assuming responsibility for after care and
other social support. This relieves the demand on the public purse while
ensuring greater access to justice for those who need it.
The American contingency fee system has been the subject of
much criticism by many in Britain and is now under attack in the United
States. It is unfortunate that many in Britain who criticize have been silent
as an increasing proportion of the British public have become
disenfranchised from a legal system, which purports to serve them, often
sees just claims not pursued or victims bullied into inadequate settlement.
Those in the United States who see apparent advantages in the "expenses
rule" should consider with care the effect such a rule will have on access
to justice.
It has been said that the contingency fee system will encourage
lawyers to take shortcuts and to be unethical. The logic of this argument is
difficult to follow. It presumes that the system in Britain is free of such
problems or that the unscrupulous and unethical are unable to find
opportunities to abuse our system, but clearly this is not the case. Those
administering te British Legal Aid System are aware of many abuses
within that system where pointless litigation is pursued on an hourly basis
with little or no prospect of delivering any success to the claimant. The
system of hourly paid fees, whether legally aided or privately funded, is
always open to abuse by the unethical and unscrupulous. I am aware of no
evidence to suggest that the American system or American lawyers are any
more likely to produce such abuses than Great Britain. The question of
ethics and standards is one quite separate from how we organize access to
justice.
III. THE WAY FORWARD
I do not seek to suggest that all in the British system is wrong nor
that all in the American system is correct. I would suggest, however, that
we can learn from looking at other systems and looking at our own
critically. It is neither appropriate nor desirable to substitute one for the
other and the better course undoubtedly would be to encourage
development of our own system to meet the demands of the present day.
For my part, I would argue for an experiment in the area of personal
injury litigation. It should not be beyond the wit of government and the
profession to devise a system allowing contingency fees for certain classes
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of actions or within certain parts of the court structure. I would also argue
that such a system will not work unless it permits greater access to juries.
In principle, there is no reason why this should impose additional costs.
The option of a jury trial could result in damages sufficient to meet any
additional costs. Would it be unreasonable, for example, for those who
elect a jury trial to agree to pay a percentage of the sums awarded as a
cost? Again, I would suggest this would be payable only on success,
reflecting the philosophy of contingency based litigation and ensuring that
those who were of modest means were not disadvantaged in the pursuit of
their claims.
I am the first to appreciate that these proposals are imperfect, but
then again, so is the current system. We are in urgent need of reform. It
is a reform which, to be successful, requires everyone to contribute to
ensure that we end up with a system which meets the expectations and
needs of the public that it seeks to serve.

